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“I used to go to trial a lot. . . . You can get more out of a trial and the
sadness in it and the poignancy in it than you could ever imagine.”
—Murder Mystery Author, Mary Higgins Clark1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, cyberstalking, cyberbullying, and related
crimes have offered new legal remedies for Internet use that causes
harm to others.2 From the first 1990s cyberstalking offense to the re-
venge porn statutes enacted in over thirty-four states today, the crimi-
nal justice system continues to support and expand criminalizing
Internet misuse as a form of interpersonal violence and aggression.3
Constitutional First Amendment and overbreadth claims have not yet
posed a significant challenge to this trend.4 Although expanded
University of Nebraska College of Law Center for Space, Cyber, and
Telecommunications Law for an excellent, thought-provoking symposium in
March 2017. Finally, thank you to my son, Atticus, for a shared appreciation of
the need to promote the human spirit in an increasingly technological world.
1. Mary Higgins Clark, The Queen of Suspense, CBS NEWS SUNDAY MORNING (Apr.
2, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mary-higgins-clark-the-queen-of-
suspense [http://perma.unl.edu/74NJ-SZ7U].
2. For a more in-depth discussion of the cybercrime offenses and their elements, see
generally Amy Lai, Dangerous Proximity: Using High-Tech Evidence in the Crim-
inal Prosecution of Domestic Violence, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 548 (2012); Aily Shimizu,
Domestic Violence in the Digital Age: Towards the Creation of a Comprehensive
Cyberstalking Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 116 (2013); and Cassie
Cox, Comment, Protecting Victims of Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and On-
line Impersonation Through Prosecutions and Effective Laws, 54 JURIMETRICS J.
277 (2014).
3. The State of California adopted the first cyberstalking offense in the United
States in 1999. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (Deering 2017). The federal Violence
Against Women Act first criminalized cyberstalking in 2000. See 47 U.S.C. § 223
(2012) (entitled “Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia
or in interstate or foreign communications”); CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, RE-
VENGE PORN STATISTICS (2014), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/up
loads/2014/12/RPStatistics.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/6C7L-JXT8]; Ioana Vasiu &
Lucian Vasiu, Light My Fire: A Roentgenogram of Cyberstalking Cases, 40 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 41, 53 (2016) (“Though cyberstalking may not necessarily appear to
be a violent act, Florida law treats it as such . . . .”). See generally Lee C. Durio,
Note, Turn Your Cameras Off in the Bedroom: “Revenge Porn” Is Now a Felony in
Louisiana, 43 S.U. L. REV. 251 (2016); George F. du Pont, Comment, The
Criminalization of True Anonymity in Cyberspace, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 191, 201 (2001).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Matusiewicz, 84 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D. Del. 2015) (holding
that the federal cyberstalking statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad); Bur-
roughs v. Corery, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (holding that the Florida
cyberstalking statute is not a facial violation of the First Amendment); People v.
Sucic, 928 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (upholding the validity of the state
cyberstalking offense against constitutional First Amendment overbreadth chal-
lenges). Also note that civil remedies for cybercrime provide parallel protections
to criminal charges and are supported by anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation) statutory provisions protecting crime victims in
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criminalization seeks to enhance justice for crime victims, it may also
aggravate invasions of privacy for cybercrime victims through the re-
sulting public record of court proceedings. Without adequate privacy
protections, cybercrime victim witnesses in particular may be dis-
incentivized to cooperate while offenders intent on humiliating and in-
timidating victims are able to use the court as a tool of abuse.
Protected by immunity and strict statutory interpretation of public
records laws, government actors take little responsibility for the sub-
sequent release of information about victims of computer crime ob-
tained through official investigation and litigation.5 The subpoena
power of legislators and prosecutors to combat cybercrime and related
offenses, such as human trafficking, reach deeply into the private
worlds of vulnerable crime victims of all ages.6 While some victims
may consent to such intrusions, particularly when filing parallel civil
actions for cyberstalking,7 others may have their privacy invaded
without their consent by both perpetrators and the government
through public prosecution. Moreover, injunctive relief is elusive, par-
ticularly in Internet-distribution cases, where the risk of distribution
of information grows exponentially and internationally even if the pri-
mary perpetrator is convicted and incarcerated.8 If, in the creation of
legal sanctions for interpersonal cybercrime, there is little assurance
of a personal benefit for most victims of crime, then the benefit to soci-
ety through prosecutorial deterrence should at least be clear and well-
defined, and ensure minimal harm to the victims themselves.
Pseudonym and anonymity policies, developed prior to the Digital
Age, are disfavored based on constitutional protections afforded the
bringing claims. See, e.g., Lemoine v. Wolfe, 812 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2016) (discuss-
ing a crime victim’s defenses to malicious-prosecution tort claims following dis-
missal of cyberstalking charges regarding posting critical comments about a
judge).
5. E.g., Ark. State Police v. Wren, 491 S.W.3d 124 (Ark. 2016) (interpreting state
Freedom of Information Act provisions to cover motor vehicle records but not law
enforcement accident reports, thus disclosing names and addresses of accident
victims and offenders).
6. See Senate Permanent Subcomm. v. Ferrer, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2016)
(permitting the Senate Subcommittee’s broad, fact-finding investigation into in-
terstate cyberstalking).
7. See Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Mass. 2015)
(addressing sex-trafficking victims’ federal and state civil claims against online-
advertisement-forum operators).
8. See Arthur Gaus, Trolling Attacks and the Need for New Approaches to Privacy
Torts, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 363 (2012) (“Many subjects of trolling attacks find
out they have been targeted only once the circulation of the attack reaches a cer-
tain level.”). Cf. Horowitz v. Horowitz, 160 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (citing Branson v. Rodriguez-Linares, 143 So. 3d 1070, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014)) (providing that a finding of domestic violence cyberstalking supports
injunctive relief).
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defendant and the ensured integrity of the criminal justice system.9
Remedies for undue intrusion or negligent storage of evidence by the
government during or after litigation may be negligible or involve yet
more privacy intrusions through additional litigation.10 Crime-vic-
tims’-rights advocates on the national stage continue to struggle to
find acceptable legal remedies for victims of cybercrime in the court
system.11
Today, individual perpetrators and their accomplices can easily
purchase a portable drone with a miniature camera for less than one
hundred dollars12 to spy on the lives of others outside the courtroom
9. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008) (focus-
ing on the public interest in disclosure of information when anonymity is re-
quested); see also infra Part III (addressing the need to balance constitutional
rights with the needs of crime victims).
10. See, e.g., Kelley v. FBI, 67 F. Supp. 3d 240 (D.D.C. 2014) (addressing government
immunity from tortious liability for intrusive investigation and disclosure of the
private information of cyberstalking crime victims); see also Yount v. Handshoe,
171 So. 3d 381 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (applying anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation) protections to permit a father to file suit for defa-
mation, invasion of privacy, and cyberstalking after an Internet blogger repeat-
edly posted the minor son’s pornographic drawing online, a drawing which had
been filed with the court in a divorce proceeding).
11. See Fighting for Victims’ Rights in Child Rape Image Cases, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM
L. INST. (Dec. 18, 2013), https://law.lclark.edu/live/news/24416-fighting-for-vic
tims-rights-in-child-rape-image [http://perma.unl.edu/5KQW-YUAZ] (noting the
filing of amicus briefs in numerous restitution cases on behalf of online child por-
nography victims, including Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014),
which vacated the $3.4 million award to the child victim); see also Janet Law-
rence, Comment, The Peril of Paroline: How the Supreme Court Made It More
Difficult for Victims of Child Pornography, 2016 BYU L. REV. 325 (arguing that
the legislative intent of the Mandatory Restitution Act was to award victims of
child pornography the full amount of their losses in restitution).
12. For example, the SkyRider 3-Axis Gyroscope WiFi Drone is available from J.C.
Penney stores for ninety-nine dollars and is marketed as follows: “Get a bird’s-eye
view and capture unforgettable moments with the 3-axis SkyRider drone that has
a built-in camera. Its 300-ft. control range will help you cover the entire event
with ease.” SkyRider 3-Axis Gyroscope WiFi Drone, JCPENNEY, http://www.jcpen
ney.com/p/skyrider-3-axis-gyroscope-wifi-drone/ppr5007114655?pTmplType_regu
lar&catId_SearchResults&searchTerm_skyrider+3+axis+gyroscope+wifi [http://
perma.unl.edu/6VJT-FN75]; see A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-
Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2015) (addressing re-
strictions on the right to self-help in preventing intrusion on seclusion by drones
and robots). But see Michael Berry, The Drones Are Coming . . . and for Now We
Should Get Out of Their Way, 36 PA. LAW. 50 (2014) (arguing that existing tort
claims are sufficient to address invasions of privacy by drones). State criminal
statutory reform is beginning to address these privacy concerns. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-31a02(c) (2016) (redefining “harassment” in the Protection from
Stalking Act to include “any course of conduct carried out through the use of an
unmanned aerial system over or near any dwelling, occupied vehicle or other
place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from uninvited intrusion or
surveillance”). Subsection (e) of the statute defines “unmanned aerial system” as
“a powered, aerial vehicle that: (1) Does not carry a human operator; (2) uses
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or quietly turn on their cellphones to record testimony and images of
victim witnesses inside the courtroom. They can threaten victims re-
peatedly online with words and images from anywhere across the
globe, sometimes turning a major profit from the abuse through extor-
tion or even advertising.13 And yet, in addition to such violations,
cybercrime victims bear substantial personal-safety risks in relying on
the court system for assistance. Courts today are more public than
ever, some experimenting with live streaming their proceedings14 or
permitting public live blogging during trial.15 It is imperative that the
judicial system remain steadfast in its obligation to protect vulnerable
categories of crime victims in a Digital Age while ensuring access to
justice for defendants and witnesses alike.16
II. CYBERCRIME AND THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF
LOSS OF PRIVACY
Cybercrime offenses address Internet-based conduct presumed to
be harmful to individuals. What is less clear is the legislative and judi-
cial perception of the risk of harm to society in general from online
intrusions on privacy or the dissemination of greater amounts of infor-
mation through the Internet. Morbid fascination with court dramas
and true crime remains pervasive in modern entertainment, with lit-
tle consideration by the judiciary of its impact on the willingness of
actual crime victims to cooperate with the justice system. The courts
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift; (3) may fly autonomously or be piloted
remotely; (4) may be expendable or recoverable; and (5) may carry a lethal or
nonlethal payload.” § 60-31a02(e).
13. See Katherine Quarmby, How the Law Is Standing Up to Cyberstalking, NEWS-
WEEK (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/22/how-law-standing-
cyberstalking-264251.html [http://perma.unl.edu/JBW5-VELQ] (describing dis-
turbing incidents, such as an autistic child being tortured on video ranked by
consumers as “the funniest video” on Google in Italy for a period of time).
14. See COURTROOM VIEW NETWORK, http://cvn.com [http://perma.unl.edu/Q648-
YZ68] (providing recordings and live streaming of American trial proceedings);
see also Appellate Court Oral Argument Audio, ILL. CTS., http://www.state.il.us/
court/Media/Appellate/default.asp [http://perma.unl.edu/4HHU-V5QA] (provid-
ing video and audio recordings of Illinois Court of Appeals oral arguments); Su-
preme Court Oral Argument Audio & Video—2017, ILL. CTS.,  http://state.il.us/
court/Media/On_Demand.asp [http://perma.unl.edu/2L7T-LB4X] (providing video
and audio recordings of Illinois Supreme Court oral arguments).
15. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Explains Why He Allowed a Reporter to Live
Blog Federal Criminal Trial, ABA J. (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/bloggers_cover_us_trials_of_accused_terrorists_cheney_aide_and_
iowa_landlor [http://perma.unl.edu/9H2W-AZ3W] (describing state and federal
cases permitting journalists to live blog and simultaneously receive comments
from the public during their descriptions of the trial).
16. See also Julie Sobowale, Law Firms Must Manage Cybersecurity Risks, ABA J.,
Mar. 2017, at 34, 43 (“We have the ethical obligation of protecting and safeguard-
ing client data. People expect lawyers to know better.” (quoting law firm partner
Mark McCreary)).
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express little concern regarding the impact of unsavory information
and images on the public at large. As the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded in 2011 in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the social
impact of a digital or information age remains uncertain, particularly
when it involves fictitious content:
In the 1800’s, dime novels depicting crime and “penny dreadfuls” (named for
their price and content) were blamed in some quarters for juvenile delin-
quency. When motion pictures came along, they became the villains in-
stead . . . . For a time, our Court did permit broad censorship of movies
because of their capacity to be “used for evil,” but we eventually reversed
course. Radio dramas were next, and then came comic books. Many in the late
1940’s and early 1950’s blamed comic books for fostering a “preoccupation
with violence and horror” among the young, leading to a rising juvenile crime
rate. But efforts to convince Congress to restrict comic books failed. And, of
course, after comic books came television and music lyrics.17
The Internet permits rapid, wide dissemination of information
about both fictitious and actual events. Rather than restrict the me-
dium of distribution due to its reach, speed, and potentially greater
impact, the courts have instead focused on the content of information
sent online and the intent of the sender. Following the Court’s ratio-
nale in Brown, the evolutionary march of technology—including expo-
sure to mass information—has a negligible, or at least unknown,
influence on the general well-being of society. Victims of crime may
disagree.
For example, the Court has held that state restrictions on virtual
child pornography may violate the First Amendment, while pornogra-
phy involving real children constitutes a criminal offense not subject
to the protection of free speech.18 Given that content-based restric-
tions on speech are narrow exceptions under the First Amendment,19
the likelihood that persons who consider themselves to be cybercrime
victims will be treated as such by the courts is rendered more remote.
Such restrictions include permitting content-based restrictions “only
for a few historic categories of speech, including incitement, obscenity,
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called ‘fighting
words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting
some grave and imminent threat the Government has the power to
prevent.”20
17. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 797 (2011) (citations omitted).
18. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), superseded by statute,
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, as recognized in United States v. Beaty, No.
1:08-cr-51-SJM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121473 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2009) (relying
on New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
19. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012); see also Gregory P. Magarian,
The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First Amendment
Speech Exclusion, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339 (2015) (arguing the Roberts
Court cares about protecting free speech against censorship, but only to the ex-
tent speakers will not challenge social or political stability).
20. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709.
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True crime as modern entertainment—in the form of revenge porn
websites, reality law-enforcement and court television, some live-
streamed court blogs, and artistic or comic digital renderings of liti-
gants and their stories—all bear the familiar voyeuristic and opportu-
nistic tones of the original penny dreadful.21 “In 19th-century
America, cheap pamphlets disseminated all sorts of popular culture to
a mass audience, everything from religion and politics to sex and vio-
lence. Publishers understood that, like today, sensationalism sells.
Murder trials provided sensational content, and especially murder tri-
als where women were the victims or the accused.”22 What protection
government is willing to provide to those subject to exposure in the
court system is based in part on value judgments of what constitutes
real harm worthy of intervention.
The historic concerns that do exist regarding risks of public expo-
sure for litigants, witnesses, and jurors have related to interference
with the administration of justice and public safety,23 and eventually
financial risks associated with harm to reputation. For example, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Brown justified the
empaneling of an anonymous jury and continued maintenance of ano-
nymity after the trial’s conclusion: “Very real threats were posed by
excessive media coverage, by the trial participants’ eagerness to ma-
nipulate the News Media, and by the risk of jury harassment and
taint. The judge was empowered and entitled to counteract each of
these threats in order to assure a fair trial.”24 In contrast, as stated
above, the Court seems dubious of the negative impact on society of
information itself, whether some find it to be graphic, violent, or
deeply disturbing.25
As the debate continues to fester over the social relevance of a clear
loss of personal privacy in the Digital Age, expanding social-science
21. For an interesting analysis of penny dreadfuls and Nineteenth Century sensa-
tionalist entertainment wallowing in flesh and blood, see Michael Ariens, The
Invention of Murder: How the Victorians Revelled in Death and Detection and
Created Modern Crime, 61 FED. LAW. 104 (2014) (book review) (describing author
Judith Flanders’ depiction of “[p]ennybloods [which] were later called penny-
dreadfuls, and were abhorred by the middle class, which found other ways to
embrace the same violence, as by attending murder trials or reading fiction writ-
ten to their tastes”); and Ian Ward, Things Little Girls Have No Business to Know
Anything About: The Crimes of Aurora Floyd, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 430
(2011).
22. MURDER AND WOMEN IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA: TRIAL ACCOUNTS IN THE YALE
LAW LIBRARY: AN EXHIBITION CURATED BY EMMA MOLINA WIDENER & MICHAEL
WIDENER 4 (2015), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1012&context=AMtrials.
23. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 346 (1946).
24. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 922 (5th Cir. 2001).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (holding that state
restrictions on the sale of violent video games to minors violated the First
Amendment upon lack of a sufficient nexus to any harm to youth).
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research provides a degree of insight. Some logically argue that if
nearly everyone in society willingly uses the Internet as a public tool
for information searches and sharing of sensitive material, then ef-
forts to obtain greater privacy protections under the law are a lost
cause.26 Others suggest that global research demonstrating society’s
continued interest in retaining and restoring privacy rights is already
having an impact on commercial and governmental entities.27 Ques-
tions remain whether individuals in society are becoming acclimated
to greater transparency and loss of privacy, and whether loss of pri-
vacy persistently inflicts personal harms which we are only beginning
to understand. At present, social-science research indicates the latter,
which bodes well for privacy rights legal advocates.
Research indicates that a perception of social stigma influences be-
havior significantly, requiring, for example, assurances of privacy and
confidentiality for many young adults who seek mental health ser-
vices.28 The strength of crime victim services, including those within
the criminal justice system, is highly dependent on the victim’s level of
trust that those services maintain confidentiality and support the vic-
26. E.g., Jacob Morgan, Privacy Is Completely and Utterly Dead, and We Killed It,
FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/08/19/
privacy-is-completely-and-utterly-dead-and-we-killed-it/#27ec95f431a7 [http://
perma.unl.edu/CM3G-RJFH] (“I think we’ve clearly reached a point in today’s
world where privacy is pretty much a lost cause.”).
27. See, e.g., Lieutenant Commander Joseph Romero, National Archives and Record
Administration v. Favish: Protecting Against the Prying Eye, the Disbelievers,
and the Curious, 50 NAVAL L. REV. 70, 99–100 (2004) (arguing that new technol-
ogy “pander[s] to our voyeuristic tendencies,” but that Congress has responded by
strengthening privacy protections in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA));
Jennifer L. Bauer, Abstract, Big Data, Big Money, Big Shadows (May 28, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2804760 [http://perma.unl.
edu/4WYC-KLKK] (recommending a shift from regulating the point of data col-
lection to the points of continued data use by commercial and governmental enti-
ties to increase self-protection of personal data); Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Carnegie Mellon University Data Privacy Day:
It’s Getting Real: Privacy, Security, and Fairness in the Internet of Things (Jan.
28, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/621381/
150128dataprivacyday.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/X2DW-QZSP] (“In order to fully
reap the benefits of the Internet of Things and Big Data, both must be imbued
with tested principles of privacy.”); Jason Murdock, From Orwell to Snowden: Is
Privacy Dead in the Digital Era of Mass Surveillance?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (April 19,
2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/orwell-snowden-privacy-dead-digital-era-mass-
surveillance-1555651 [http://perma.unl.edu/4K39-2J8F] (providing global survey
results which identify privacy protections as the foremost concern of Internet
users, resulting in new cybersecurity applications for users).
28. See Donna Holland & Heidi Wheeler, College Student Stress and Mental Health:
Examination of Stigmatic Views on Mental Health Counseling, 30 MICH. SOC.
REV. 16, 36 (2016); Marrisa Y. Mar et al., Exploring e-Mental Health Preferences
of Generation Y, 32 J. TECH. IN HUM. SERVS. 312 (2014).
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tim’s own interests.29 Recent efforts to pierce the confidentiality of
mental health services have been met with resistance, such as lack of
state cooperation regarding federal online registries of persons with a
history of mental illness related to restrictions on gun ownership.30
The renewed stigma surrounding mental illness and access to weap-
ons bears a tenuous link to disputed research regarding the link be-
tween mental illness and key causes of mass violence, as well as the
privacy interests of gun-rights advocates.31
Lack of privacy generates both legal and social concerns in struc-
tured settings such as prisons,32 mental health facilities,33 or post-
disaster relief.34 Research in these settings demonstrates the shared
human value of dignity and the essential nature of privacy to achieve
healing and a sense of well-being, particularly after a personal loss or
threat. Post-disaster victims, for example, may be thrust into the pub-
lic eye, with some fearing to leave their homes or hospital rooms.
As social workers, we had conflicted feelings about the role that the media
plays following a disaster. We were able to recognise [sic] that it was a signifi-
cant means of communication for communities and, for some victims, it could
be an important avenue through which to tell their story. For some, this con-
29. See Catherine E. Burnette, From the Ground Up: Indigenous Women’s After Vio-
lence Experiences with the Formal Service System in the United States, 45 BRIT. J.
SOC. WORK 1526 (2015) (addressing indigenous women as crime victims who are
often distrustful of both law enforcement and mental health providers based on
past negative experiences).
30. See, e.g., Mental Health Reporting, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://
smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/background-checks/mental-health-repor
ting [http://perma.unl.edu/KLA7-QZAK] (decrying state failures to provide infor-
mation on persons with mental illness in the National Instant Criminal Back-
ground Check System (NICS)). The federal Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits
persons adjudicated as “mentally defective” or having been committed to a
mental institution from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4), (g)(4) (2009).
31. Jennifer Mathis, Mental Health Privacy, 41 HUM. RTS. 10 (2016) (“Diminishing
individuals’ ability to keep this [mental health] information private would do lit-
tle to protect the safety of others and would perpetuate prejudice and deter indi-
viduals from seeking help.”).
32. See Jennifer M. Reingle Gonzalez & Nadine M. Connell, Mental Health of Prison-
ers: Identifying Barriers to Mental Health Treatment and Medication Continuity,
104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2328, 2329 (2014) (identifying crowded conditions and
lack of privacy as risk factors for self-harm in prison).
33. See Joseph O’Reilly & Bruce Sales, Privacy for the Institutionalized Mentally Ill:
Are Court-Ordered Standards Effective?, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 42 (1987)
(“Empirically, privacy has been shown to be essential to the therapeutic program
of a mental health facility . . . .”); Carolyn Popham & Martin Orrell, What Matters
for People with Dementia in Care Homes?, 16 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 181, 183,
185 (2012) (determining through research that residents with dementia contin-
ued to care about privacy, personalization of space, and dignity).
34. E.g., Leah Du Plooy et al., “Black Saturday” and Its Aftermath: Reflecting on
Postdisaster Social Work Interventions in an Australian Trauma Hospital, 67
AUSTL. SOC. WORK 274 (2014).
290 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:281
tributed to their healing.  However, for others the excessive coverage and re-
quests to recount their stories seemed to be retraumatising [sic].35
For post-disaster victims, litigation to recover damages or cooperate
with criminal prosecution would again expose them to the risk of po-
tentially unwanted media and public attention.
The same argument generally holds for most victims of crime, who
may have difficulty moving on when the risk of disclosure of sensitive
information through the public record continues perpetually on the In-
ternet. Unique to cybercrime litigation, however, is the necessity to
admit into evidence a pattern of repeated online harassment in order
to prove the difficult subjective and objective mens rea elements of
knowingly causing fear in the victim.36 For many offenders and vic-
tims in domestic violence relationships, their past lives are put on
trial in even more detail to prove the legal elements, which is much
more intrusive than disclosure of a single act such as theft.37 If the
growing criminalization of harassment and cybercrime recognizes the
privacy harms to the individual, then the court system should take
special notice of the availability of measures to protect the continued
privacy interests of litigants and victim witnesses.
III. BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
TRANSPARENCY WITH THE NEED FOR ANONYMITY
IN THE COURTROOM
The protective measures in the court system that aid cybercrime
and other crime victims to achieve privacy and safety frequently in-
spire constitutional challenges. Although trial courts have discretion
to alter the conditions of the courtroom, they may not create condi-
tions that infringe on the fundamental rights of the defendant and the
public. “Close judicial scrutiny” is required, and “[c]ourts must do the
best they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure,
based on reason, principle, and common human experience.”38 Adjust-
ing court procedure and policy, including public access to records, in
35. Id. at 278 (addressing social work case study research in working with burn vic-
tims from the 2009 Australian bushfire tragedy).
36. E.g., Baird v. Baird, 322 P.3d 728 (Utah 2014) (defining the objective rather than
subjective standard required to prove the element of “emotional distress” in a
case involving an adult son filing a stalking injunction against his mother); see
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–5–106.5(2) (West 2017) (“A person is guilty of stalking who
intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person and knows or should know that the course of conduct would cause a rea-
sonable person: (a) to fear for the person’s own safety or the safety of a third
person; or (b) to suffer other emotional distress.” (emphasis added)).
37. See generally Lai, supra note 2 (discussing various academic views on the advan-
tages and disadvantages of admitting extensive sensitive evidence to prove cyber-
stalking in domestic violence cases).
38. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976).
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order to protect the interests of crime victims invokes core constitu-
tional considerations related to the rights of defendants and the integ-
rity of the court system.
The defendant’s due process right to a fair trial is a fundamental
liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion.39 Although not explicitly enumerated, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees a presumption of innocence in order to ensure a fair
trial.40 The defendant’s right to a public trial41 and the public’s re-
lated right of access to criminal proceedings42 are also guaranteed.
However, as stated in Waller v. Georgia, the right of access “may give
way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defen-
dant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting
disclosure of sensitive information.”43 Nevertheless, the general pre-
sumption is that criminal court proceedings must be public unless the
interests of the defendant and the public are substantially outweighed
by other overriding interests.44
Media access to public proceedings and subsequent reporting also
invoke freedom of speech and freedom of the press considerations at
all stages of the proceedings.45 As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1946 regarding the rights of journalists to report on pending trials:
“[W]e think the specific freedom of public comment should weigh
heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Free-
dom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with
the essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of jus-
39. See generally id. at 503 (addressing the impact that presenting a defendant in
prison attire to the jury has on the right to a fair trial); Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (addressing a defendant’s need for competency to ensure a
right to a fair trial).
40. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
42. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 212–13 (2010) (holding that the right to a public
trial includes public access to voir dire of prospective jurors); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982) (holding that a
mandatory rule which closed the courtroom in all sexual abuse cases during the
testimony of a minor victim witness violated the First Amendment); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (“[T]he First Amendment
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from sum-
marily closing courtroom doors . . . .”).
43. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984).
44. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARD 8-5.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“[I]n any
criminal matter, the public presumptively should have access to all judicial pro-
ceedings, related documents and exhibits, and any record made thereof not other-
wise required to remain confidential. A court may impose reasonable time, place
and manner limitations on public access.”).
45. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (addressing
public access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (addressing public access to voir dire).
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tice.”46 Here, the Court was concerned primarily with the fairness of
the proceedings rather than the reputations of the court personnel
and thus asserted that rights of public comment were even greater
once the proceeding had terminated.47 Pursuant to the First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Justice Douglas in Craig
v. Harney upheld the journalistic freedom to comment on a pending
case unless it creates a clear and present danger to the administration
of justice.48 Craig involved a newspaper editorial critical of a judge’s
rulings and qualifications, which resulted in the imprisonment of the
reporter for contempt.49
Gag orders on parties, witnesses, and attorneys are also subject to
First Amendment scrutiny, but not to an equal degree. For example,
local rules prohibiting extrajudicial statements by attorneys associ-
ated with pending trials receive less scrutiny than prior restraints on
the media.50 Generally, however, a court may impose a prior restraint
on the extrajudicial speech of trial participants only if it is narrowly
tailored to prohibit speech that is substantially likely to materially
prejudice a proceeding and provides the least restrictive means to
avoid such prejudice.51
The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section adopted
standards in 2013 entitled “Fair Trial and Public Discourse,” which
include recommended restrictions on the extrajudicial statements of
attorneys.52 Standard 8-2.1 states, in part, that a criminal attorney
should not make a public extrajudicial statement “if the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of:
. . . unnecessarily heightening public condemnation of a defendant or a
person or entity who has been publicly identified in the context of a
criminal investigation, or of a witness or victim . . . .”53 The Criminal
Justice Section specifically mentioned the need for special considera-
tion of the privacy of vulnerable persons, including “juvenile offenders
or other protected categories of offenders, victims or witnesses.”54
46. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946) (reversing a holding of contempt
against a journalist critical of Miami criminal investigations and prosecutions in
rape cases, including the use of political cartoons).
47. See id. at 346.
48. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372 (1947).
49. Craig, 331 U.S. 367.
50. In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 2016) (relying in part on Gentile v. State
Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991)).
51. Id. at 562 (holding that a local court rule in Louisiana prohibiting extrajudicial
statements by attorneys in a pending case violated the First Amendment).
52. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARD 8-2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
53. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARD 8-2.1(a)(ii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
54. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARD 8-2.1(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). Never-
theless, Standard 8-2.2 provides somewhat conflicting public policies regarding
the treatment of victim witnesses. This standard provides that a prosecutor
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Nevertheless, the Section also put forth a standard supporting liberal
dissemination of information once that information has been made
public: “Protecting the fairness of a criminal trial is by itself an insuf-
ficient basis for rules or judicial orders prohibiting members of the
public from disseminating or otherwise making available by means of
public communication any information in their possession relating to
a criminal matter.”55
Prior restraints on speech are not unconstitutional per se but do
hold a “heavy presumption” against constitutional validity.56 For ex-
ample, in a child-protection case, the Court of Appeals of Nebraska
held that a judicial restriction on parental disclosure of a minor’s med-
ical records was not justified.57 In contrast, in Fairley v. Andrews,
threatening speech was not constitutionally protected by the First
Amendment.58 The plaintiffs in Fairley presented evidence that some
of their coworkers in Chicago’s Cook County Jail had engaged in
threats and hostile conduct to deter other guards from testifying re-
garding inmate abuse by guards.59 The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the First Amendment does not protect such threats
and conduct when they are “designed to discourage future speech.”60
Interests frequently conflict surrounding the constitutional rights of
defendants, witnesses, and the public when attempting to protect the
privacy of persons in the courtroom, and the balance of interests may
be determined by the types of protections available.
Several procedural tools are available to the court to protect the
identity, and therefore the privacy and safety, of persons required to
attend court hearings. Empaneling anonymous juries, for example, by
use of numbers rather than names is an option. Another is to provide
pseudonyms to litigants and witnesses, such as initials or Jane or
John Doe fictitious names. Both measures have longstanding prece-
should avoid making public statements which include the following information
about victims and other witnesses: “the identity, race, ethnicity, creed, religion,
or sexual orientation, expected testimony, criminal record, character, reputation,
or credibility of prospective witnesses.” CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARD
8-2.2(a)(vii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). This portion is followed by subsection (b),
which states that providing information on “the identity of the victim, when the
release of that information is not otherwise prohibited by law or would not be
harmful to the victim” is not ordinarily a violation of Standard 8-2.2. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS, Standard 8-2.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
55. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARD 8-5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
56. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).
57. In re T.T., 18 Neb. App. 176, 779 N.W.2d 602 (2009) (addressing the records of a
minor who had been left at the hospital under Nebraska’s Safe Haven Law).
58. See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
First Amendment protects against threats of punishment designed to prevent fu-
ture speech).
59. Id. at 518.
60. Id. at 525.
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dent in both state and federal courts supporting their use. In a Digital
Age, such measures that hide identity in court records are particularly
helpful to persons afraid of the loss of privacy through redisclosure of
sensitive case information online. Unless the case involves jury tam-
pering, jurors do not share the same concerns as cybercrime victims
who may have been directly targeted by the defendant. Jurors are
merely participating in the court proceedings. Nonetheless, it is in-
structive to consider the development of the court’s willingness to em-
panel anonymous juries based on some shared concerns such as
appreciation for the social stigma and loss of privacy that could result
if the proceedings are redistributed on the Internet.
A. Anonymous Juries
If the court finds a special risk is present, an anonymous jury may
be impaneled.61 In making this determination in federal court, the
trial court is granted deference on appeal subject to an abuse of discre-
tion standard because it “require[s] a trial court to make a sensitive
appraisal of the climate surrounding a trial and a prediction as to the
potential security or publicity problems that may arise during the pro-
ceedings.”62 The anonymity protection of jurors may persist beyond
the termination of proceedings, for example, if the court is convinced
of an ongoing risk of harassment and intimidation.63
Due process challenges invariably arise,64 with some arguing that
jury anonymity taints the presumption of innocence during trial as
well as the effective use of peremptory challenges during voir dire.65
61. See, e.g., United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 343 (6th Cir. 2009) (permitting
an anonymous jury in a drug conspiracy prosecution under 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7)
in the interests of justice for the purpose of preventing intimidation and other
potential interference with the jury); State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 530–31
(Minn. 1995) (holding that an anonymous jury may be impaneled when “there is
strong reason to believe that the jury needs protection from external threats to its
members’ safety or impartiality”); State v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309, 327, 788
N.W.2d 172, 196 (2010) (identifying anonymity or the identification of jurors by
numbers as a drastic measure to be avoided unless “there is a strong reason to
believe the jury needs protection”).
62. United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 702–03 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
63. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 921–22 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying a motion
to reveal anonymous jurors’ names, addresses, and answers to a confidential ju-
ror questionnaire).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
65. E.g., Allen v. United States, 829 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 2016), petition for cert.
filed, No. 16-8229 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2017) (Westlaw, U.S. Sup. Ct. Dockets) (address-
ing defendant’s argument that an anonymous juror “led the jury to believe [defen-
dant] was dangerous”); Commonwealth v. Anguilo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 169 (Mass.
1993) (noting the state and federal reluctance to permit anonymous juries in capi-
tal cases).
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Transparent voir dire is seen as an additional component of the right
to a fair trial: “Openness is fostered by the public knowledge of who is
on the impaneled jury. Armed with such knowledge, the public can
confirm the impartiality of the jury, which acts as an additional check
upon the prosecutorial and judicial process.”66
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Fernandez
held that the empaneling of an anonymous jury would be upheld only
upon consideration of the following: “where (1) there is a strong reason
for concluding that it is necessary to enable the jury to perform its
factfinding function, or to ensure juror protection; and (2) reasonable
safeguards are adopted by the trial court to minimize any risk of in-
fringement upon the fundamental rights of the accused.”67 The Fer-
nandez prosecution related to alleged racketeering by the Eme or
Mexican Mafia.68 Particular concerns with organized crime have
filtered into judicial decision-making relating not only to anonymity of
jurors but to the anonymity and protection of witnesses and parties.
As a result, Fernandez laid out more specific non-exclusive factors to
balance in these cases:
(1) the defendants’ involvement with organized crime;
(2) the defendants’ participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors;
(3) the defendants’ past attempts to interfere with the judicial process or
witnesses;
(4) the potential that the defendants will suffer lengthy incarceration if con-
victed; and
(5) extensive publicity that could enhance the possibility that jurors’ names
would become public and expose them to intimidation and harassment.69
According to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, by 1995 “every court
that has considered the issue has concluded that in appropriate cir-
cumstances the empanelment of an anonymous jury does not infringe
on the right to an impartial jury.”70 Indeed, few state and federal
courts have ruled otherwise since.71
66. Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 904 (Pa. 2007).
67. United States. v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1244 (9th Cir. 2004) (following
Shryock, 342 F.3d at 971, and United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.
1998)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1244 (citations omitted).
70. United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1532 (8th Cir. 1995) (providing a thor-
ough overview of the approaches of federal courts of appeals to empaneling an
anonymous jury).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Calabrese, 515 F. Supp. 2d 880 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (denying
newspaper access to the names of anonymously empaneled jurors); United States
v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 880 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (granting a motion for an anon-
ymous jury in a capital drug trafficking case); Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d
892 (Pa. 2007) (favoring the disclosure of jurors’ names, but not addresses, in
addressing newspapers’ and television stations’ access to jurors identities during
deliberations). But see State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Bond, 781
N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 2002) (holding that a trial court erred in denying a newspaper
request for juror names, addresses, and questionnaire responses during a capital
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In March 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court received a petition for re-
view of Allen v. United States, an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cision finding no ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object
to the use of numbers rather than names of jurors.72 The defendant
was convicted of the capital crime of armed bank robbery causing the
death of a security guard.73 Applying the highly deferential Strick-
land standard, the court held that case law was not sufficiently settled
on the issue of empaneling an anonymous jury to deem counsel’s
choice deficient or prejudicial.74 That is, “[t]he failure of counsel to
anticipate a rule of law that has yet to be articulated does not render
counsel’s performance professionally unreasonable.”75
The essential role of the jury in court proceedings requires height-
ened protections to ensure safety and an absence of jury tampering
throughout the trial. However, the risk factors of intimidation and
harassment both during and after trial are no less real for many vic-
tims of crime, particularly cybercrime victims who face stalking be-
haviors. In addition, the risks of long-term trauma for jurors would
presumably be far less than that experienced by litigants and key wit-
nesses who were personally associated with the criminal offense.
Courts should not forget that the right to a fair trial is also dependent
on the willingness of witnesses to cooperate and testify.
B. Jane Doe Motions and Disclosure of Litigant and Witness
Identities
For centuries the courts have procedurally protected jurors against
intimidation and coercion, but the same is not true for parties and
witnesses. “For important reasons, jurors consider evidence and de-
liver verdicts in courtrooms open to the public, but have historically
deliberated in private and received a measure of confidentiality once
their work is done.”76 In contrast, the use of fictitious names for liti-
murder trial, which were presumptively subject to disclosure under the First
Amendment).
72. Allen v. United States, 829 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed,
No. 16-8229 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2017) (Westlaw, U.S. Sup. Ct. Dockets). Counsel were
provided with names and addresses of venire men before jury selection, but dur-
ing voir dire and trial only numbers were used so that counsel did not know
which names related to which numbers. Id. at 966.
73. Id.
74. Id. (applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
75. Id. at 967 (citations omitted).
76. United States v. Jenkins, No. 12-15-GFVT, 2012 WL 5868907, at *3 (E.D. Ky.
Nov. 20, 2012) (citation omitted) (“If during that sacred time jurors must worry
that the fair and impartial decision they make in the jury room will lead to har-
assment and molestation from the parties, the attorneys, or others when they
leave it, a major blow is dealt to the administration of justice.”).
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gants in order to preserve their anonymity is generally disfavored.77
The right to public access to the courts and the defendant’s right to
confrontation support the disclosure of litigants’ names.78 To grant
anonymity to litigants, the court must find that the harm to the mo-
vant from disclosure of identity outweighs the harm from concealment
of names and other identifiers.79
Greater willingness to protect the identities of certain categories of
persons is clear in the judicial record, strongly influenced by cultural
perceptions of vulnerability and harm. For example, very young chil-
dren have been granted fictitious names in court documents to pre-
serve their anonymity.80 While victims of sex offenses have often been
granted anonymity,81 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to expand these categories to include sexual harassment of adults,
even in a case involving a police stalker who broke into the victim’s
home and sexually assaulted her.82 The court argued that “sexual har-
assment cases are not brought anonymously even when the facts are
gamier than they are here. The plaintiff is not a minor, [or] a rape or
torture victim . . . .”83
In the context of cybercrime, the provision of anonymity for victims
of revenge porn in state and federal appellate opinions demonstrates
an incipient measure of inconsistency. The umbrella term “revenge
porn” encompasses a variety of crimes among state jurisdictions, often
having in common an element of dissemination of nude or sexual im-
agery without consent. For example, in Vermont, for the offense of
Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images Without Consent, a person
commits a felony, facing up to two years in prison, if he or she:
knowingly discloses a visual image of an identifiable person who is nude or
who is engaged in sexual conduct, without his or her consent, with the intent
to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted, and the
disclosure would cause a reasonable person to suffer harm. A person may be
identifiable from the image itself or information offered in connection with the
77. See Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2004); cf. Cheyenne Newspa-
pers Inc. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 358 P.3d 493 (Wyo. 2015) (holding that the
trial court improperly withheld the names of juvenile witnesses during a murder
trial in violation of the First Amendment).
78. E.g., Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011).
79. Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d at 669; see also Doe v. Roe, 599 N.Y.2d 350 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993) (addressing civil litigation with both parties in Doe status involv-
ing inadvertent disclosure of HIV status).
80. E.g., Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2004).
81. E.g., People v. Desisto, No. B262564, 2016 WL 5224371 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 6,
2016) (upholding a conviction for sexual penetration by foreign object, as well as
unauthorized invasion of privacy for taking cell phone images of the adult victim,
identified as Jane Doe).
82. Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d at 667.
83. Id. at 669 (citation omitted).
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image. Consent to recording of the visual image does not, by itself, constitute
consent for disclosure of the image.84
More case law is needed to identify a clear trend in the use of Jane
Doe identification in revenge porn litigation. For now, it appears the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting or denying a request for ano-
nymity does not exhibit a clear set of determining factors.
In recent cases, both civil and criminal courts have granted protec-
tive anonymity to the person unlawfully depicted in the image.85 But
both civil and criminal courts have also proceeded in revenge porn-
related cases without providing any degree of anonymity.86 How
strongly these witnesses and litigants fought for continued privacy is
unclear, but it would be important to the administration of justice if
crime victims understood that they had the option and legal support to
seek greater privacy through Jane Doe status.
Of course, even if clear factors for considering anonymity requests
were present, judicial discretion in determining the need for protect-
ing victim privacy inevitably requires the difficult task of assessing
the degree of potential harm to the particular individual. Appellate
judges evaluating legal sufficiency in revenge porn cases, with civil
claims such as defamation or intrusion on seclusion, face similar chal-
lenges. As one court explained, “[we] must distinguish between shades
and degrees of emotions, such as between disappointment and severe
disappointment, between embarrassment and wounded pride, [and]
between anger and indignation.”87 How courts evaluate and value the
privacy of victims of cybercrime may be largely dependent on the skill
of attorneys in demonstrating victim impact, particularly in the unfa-
84. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606(1) (2017). Note that the statutory scheme for this
revenge porn offense includes higher offenses and complex definitions of elements
not included here.
85. E.g., Crapps v. State, 180 So. 3d 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (prosecuting de-
fendant for unauthorized computer use for secretly posting nude images on the
victim’s Instagram account, identifying the victim only as the “ex-girlfriend”); In
re Grossman, 538 B.R. 34 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (addressing whether a liability
judgment for disseminating a sexual video was dischargeable in bankruptcy,
identifying the victim by initials only); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d
752 (Tex. App. 2014) (addressing a motion to dismiss a class action against re-
venge porn websites, removing the names of the persons depicted and identifying
them only as plaintiffs).
86. E.g., In re White, 551 B.R. 814 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2016) (holding that a named
victim of a revenge porn website could recover her judgment for $100,000 in puni-
tive damages within the defendant’s bankruptcy proceedings); People v. Barber,
992 N.Y.S. 2d 159 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2014) (holding that nudity alone does not sat-
isfy the “prurient interest” element of the charge of Public Display of Offensive
Sexual Material with respect to a named crime victim witness in the first crimi-
nal prosecution of revenge porn in New York).
87. Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 178 (Tex. App. 2016) (addressing claims that a
former boyfriend posted secretly recorded sexual videos of his girlfriend on the
Internet). Here, the plaintiff is identified by name in the opinion. Whether she
sought and was denied anonymity was not at issue.
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miliar territory of protecting the privacy of adult victims of
cybercrime.
While a disfavored practice, adoption of fictitious names and use of
initials for litigants or vulnerable witnesses do have a long common
law history. Moreover, they do not bear the indicia of unreliability ac-
companying an anonymous tip88 because the litigants are generally
available for cross-examination in court. In a review of every case in
the American federal and state appellate record in which a litigant
was called Jane Doe, it is striking that the use of the pseudonym has
exponentially increased in recent decades. This review revealed more
than ten thousand Jane Doe litigants throughout American legal his-
tory, but only eighty-nine prior to 1960.89 This does not include the
few who may have been named Jane Roe or Jane Moe by the court.
Similar to John Doe arrest warrants,90 occasionally the name Jane
Doe was used as a placeholder until the true name of the litigant was
known.91 But in the earliest case law it was often simply a replace-
ment for the female litigant’s first name, as her true last name ap-
peared after Jane Doe, and she was easily identifiable by her status.92
Courts gradually began to use the pseudonym to show sensitivity to
litigants and witnesses in the twentieth century when their true iden-
88. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (explaining “an anonymous tip
alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity” suffi-
cient to support reasonable suspicion to stop a person).
89. These statistics are based on research by the author using the Westlaw database
to search all state and federal cases.
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McNabb, 91 Pa. Super. 582, 584 (1927) (“John Doe
solicited and procured a large gathering of people to be at said club for the pur-
pose of witnessing an immoral show, participated in by women and girls from
Philadelphia, Pa., said women and girls then and there being scantily attired,
and dancing suggestive dances.”); State v. Burdick, 395 S.W.3d 120 (Tenn. 2012)
(upholding the validity of a John Doe warrant listing only the suspect’s genetic
DNA code).
91. E.g., Martin v. The Bud, 172 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949) (unknown and never deter-
mined identity); Thompson v. Alford, 66 P. 983 (Cal. 1901) (first case to discuss
the use of Jane Doe as a pseudonym.); People v. Davis, 31 P. 1109 (Cal. 1893)
(providing the earliest published appellate case using the name Jane Doe, who
was an unknown crime victim of a pickpocket spotted by eyewitnesses).
92. E.g., Wilson v. Robinson, 275 U.S. 526 (1927) (providing the first Supreme Court
case to use the pseudonym Jane Doe, regarding a litigant and associates with the
same last name, as noted in Wilson v. Robinson, 16 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1926));
Silverstone v. Harn, 120 P. 109, 110 (Wash. 1912) (listing respondents as “John
P. Lynn and Jane Doe Lynn, his wife”).
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tity was unnecessary to the proceedings93 or if disclosure would risk
their safety.94
Today, anonymity of litigants and witnesses raises vigorous First
Amendment95 and due process challenges on behalf of both defend-
ants and plaintiffs. For example, one federal court gave special protec-
tion to the marketplace of anonymous speech online, including the
importance of remaining anonymous as a witness and litigant to pre-
serve that right:
The free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability
of Internet users to communicate anonymously. If Internet users could be
stripped of that anonymity by a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal rules
of civil discovery, this would have a significant chilling effect on Internet com-
munications and thus on basic First Amendment rights. Therefore, discovery
requests seeking to identify anonymous Internet users must be subjected to
careful scrutiny by the courts.96
Even greater protections of anonymous speech and identity in court
are granted to persons who are not parties but merely witnesses, in-
cluding those posting offensive material online.97 Hopefully, this is an
indication that judges could become more sensitive to the concerns of
witnesses, particularly crime victim witnesses, who would not report
the offense or cooperate with a criminal investigation or prosecution if
the courtroom experience were too unsafe or unduly invasive.
Unfortunately, this understanding is still not shared by all. In
2015, the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Cheyenne Newspapers Inc. v.
First Judicial District Court held that the following trial court order
infringed on the public’s First Amendment rights: “No one may . . .
release the name of a juvenile witness during the trial.”98 The court
applied a three-part test to balance: “(1) the nature and extent of the
news coverage in question; (2) whether measures other than a prior
93. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 84 P. 784, 785 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1906) (declin-
ing to name a known woman who engaged in adultery with the defendant in a
divorce action); Buxton v. Ulmann, 156 A.2d 508, 514–15 (Conn. 1959) (“Because
of the intimate and distressing details alleged in these complaints, it is under-
standable that the parties who are allegedly medical patients would wish to be
anonymous.”); In re Adoption of Doe, 42 Haw. 267 (1958) (protecting the identity
of the minor child); People v. Porter, 189 N.Y.S. 664 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1921) (declin-
ing to name the woman with whom a police officer was found in bed).
94. See Swanne Soon Young Pang v. United States, 209 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1953)
(protecting a sex-trafficking victim); United States v. Ghiorsi, 31 F.2d 440 (N.D.
Cal. 1929) (protecting an eyewitness in a Prohibition-related prosecution).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
96. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
97. Id. at 1095 (“[N]on-party disclosure is only appropriate in the exceptional case
where the compelling need for the discovery sought outweighs the First Amend-
ment rights of the anonymous speaker.”).
98. Cheyenne Newspapers Inc. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 358 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo.
2015) (addressing a minor defendant charged as an adult with one count of mur-
der and twelve counts of aggravated assault).
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restraint on publication exist that would likely mitigate the effects of
unrestricted publicity of the juvenile’s names; and (3) the likely effec-
tiveness of a prior restraint to prevent the threatened danger.”99 Ulti-
mately the court was persuaded that anonymity would be fruitless
because the juvenile witnesses had already received direct threats
prior to testifying.100 Its analysis of the second factor is most disap-
pointing. The court held that the following optional alternatives were
sufficient to protect the youth, obviating the need for the prior re-
straint on speech: court warnings to the audience that intimidation of
a witness is a criminal offense and the publicly available services of
law enforcement.101
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California, in
contrast, also provided a three-part test for whether to grant a plain-
tiff’s motion for Doe anonymity.102 This test included different factors
focused more on the safety of the movant: “(1) the severity of the
threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s
fears, and (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retalia-
tion.”103 Generally, the court applied the simple balancing test men-
tioned in several other cases above, addressing whether the plaintiff’s
interest in anonymity outweighs the defendant and public’s interest in
disclosure of identity.104 However, the three-part test was added in
cases where risk of retaliation for litigating the case was involved.105
In 2016, the Eastern District of Missouri also demonstrated
greater sympathy for persons facing invasions of privacy through the
litigation process even though the case involved a lesser safety risk
than Cheyenne.  In this case, the data breach involved a cheaters dat-
ing website and not a threat of violence or retaliation.106 The District
Court granted the motion for pseudonyms for the forty-two plaintiffs
whose names, email addresses, credit card information, and sexual
preferences and habits were inadvertently disclosed.107 After noting
that the U.S. Supreme Court has not set a defined test for Doe mo-
tions, it enumerated various types of cases nationally that have per-
mitted fictitious names for litigants and witnesses, such as rape
99. Id. at 497 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 497–98.
101. Id. at 498.
102. Doe v. D.M. Camp & Sons, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (involving
plaintiffs who were seasonal agricultural workers in a class action lawsuit




106. In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 2669, 2016 WL
1366616 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2016).
107. Id. at *4.
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victims, child abuse victims, persons with sexually transmitted dis-
eases, and those facing physical danger.108
In short, the court summarized that “[t]he common thread running
through these cases is the presence of some social stigma or the threat
of physical harm to the plaintiffs attaching to disclosure of their iden-
tities to the public record.”109 With a compelling and particularly mod-
ern argument, opposing counsel asserted that the facts disclosed in
the breach no longer bear any particular social stigma.110 Nonethe-
less, the court held that the collection of disclosures, including finan-
cial information, “rises above the level of mere embarrassment or
harm to reputation.”111
If indeed social stigma regarding previously sensitive matters has
diminished in our Digital Age, such as perceptions and judgments re-
garding sexual behavior, the threat of physical harm and retaliation
remains for litigants and witnesses. It is also arguably premature for
the courts to believe that young persons do not feel social stigma sim-
ply because they consent to share information in the hopes they will
be safe and respected. The current social-science research for both col-
lege-age and older persons demonstrates that personal privacy is not
only important, but essential, to well-being.112
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO
COURT PROCEEDINGS
In addition to specific measures to hide the identity of jurors, par-
ties, and witnesses, many courts have adopted rules that prevent the
personal recording of proceedings by members of the public. A more
extreme approach is to deny persons access into the courtroom during
108. Id. at *2–3.
109. Id. at *3 (quoting Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 794 F. Supp. 72, 74
(D.R.I. 1992)).
110. Id. (first citing Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. Conn. 2008)
(denying anonymity to defendant in libel case despite risk of ridicule and job
loss); then citing Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992) (denying ano-
nymity to plaintiff in a discrimination suit despite having to publicly admit alco-
holism); then citing Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying a
request for anonymity for a person with alcoholism due to lack of social stigma);
then citing K.W. v. Holzapple, 299 F.R.D. 438, 442 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (denying a
request for anonymity for fraternity members caught in a police house raid with
contraband despite their entreaty that a public trial would hurt their future em-
ployment); then citing Paton v. Entercom Kan. City, LLC, No. 13-2186-KHV,
2013 WL 3524157, at *3 (D. Kan. July 11, 2013) (denying anonymity despite alle-
gations of damage to personal and profession reputation); and then citing Liberty
Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (D.
Mass. 2011) (denying anonymity despite potential embarrassment of being asso-
ciated with viewing hardcore pornography)).
111. Id. at *4.
112. See Popham & Orrell, supra note 33.
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proceedings. As with the constitutional challenges related to anonym-
ity, physical exclusion also raises substantial competing First Amend-
ment challenges. It is an age, however, wherein the Internet permits
everyone to act in the fashion of a journalist, recording, commenting,
communicating, and sharing information in real time to the world. A
practical strategy for the court to curb and control potentially harmful
or obstructive voices that infringe on the right to a fair trial is to sim-
ply not let those members present in the courtroom film, write about,
or speak about the proceedings while they occur or simply exclude
them from the proceedings altogether.
A. Bans on Recording Devices in Court
  In contrast to limited pilot programs across the United States per-
mitting livestreaming of court proceedings,113 more courts have estab-
lished rules specific to their jurisdictions that limit opportunities for
the public to record the proceedings via video, audio, and photogra-
phy.114 Resulting constitutional challenges based on an alleged in-
fringement on the right to a public trial have generally failed.115
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1965 foretold of an expan-
sion of court access by the media if new technology did not disturb the
proceedings:
Nor can the courts be said to discriminate where they permit the newspaper
reporter access to the courtroom. The television and radio reporter has the
same privilege. All are entitled to the same rights as the general public. The
news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press. When
the advances in these arts permit reporting by printing press or by television
without their present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case.116
113. In 2010, after decades of federal law restricting photography and video in the
federal court system, a three-year pilot program explored the use of video record-
ing and public posting of federal court proceedings in select jurisdictions. In
March 2016, the Judicial Conference received the evaluation of the program and
determined not to alter its previous policies, although it permitted the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals to continue the program for more long-term data on its
efficacy. See History of Cameras in Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
about-federal-courts/cameras-courts/history-cameras-courts [https://perma.unl.
edu/FS3X-DUB3].
114. See id. (providing a chronological history of the use of technology in federal
courts).
115. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (disavowing a First Amendment
right for the media to use electronic equipment in the courtroom, where the pri-
mary focus must remain on the proper administration of justice); see also Va.
Broad. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 749 S.E.2d 313 (Va. 2013) (applying section 19.2-
226 of the Virginia Code to exclude television cameras in the courtroom). The
Virginia statute states that in criminal cases “the court may, in its discretion,
exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a
fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be vio-
lated.” VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (1992).
116. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
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Such limitations on simultaneous recording and dissemination
would allow the courts to control more easily restrictions on disclosure
of evidence that may be subject to confidentiality during and after
trial, including redacted trial transcripts and the sequestration of wit-
nesses. Unrelated to privacy, prevention of jury misconduct117 and
minimization of any in-court noise distractions from electronic de-
vices118 are also frequently documented concerns. Early forms of elec-
tronic-device restriction in state courts tend to provide a permissive
rule relying heavily on judicial discretion. For example, Massachu-
setts courts are governed by the following rule:
To protect the safety and security of those who appear in court, and to mini-
mize potential distractions to court proceedings, cellular telephones and other
personal electronic devices (PED) may be prohibited from courthouses. Per-
sonal electronic devices are defined as laptop or notebook computers, com-
puter tablets, smartphones, Bluetooth and other similar devices.119
In contrast, the North Dakota Supreme Court has issued a
mandatory rule, also addressing both confidentiality and distraction:
Limitation on Electronic Recording. No camera, sound or video recorder,
or other device may be used to photograph, record, broadcast, store, or trans-
mit a proceeding of the court without prior permission from the court. Unless
the court permits otherwise, any electronic device in the courtroom must be
turned off or muted, and any authorized use of a device must be as minimally
disruptive as possible. A juror may not possess any wireless communication
device during deliberations.120
The above rule would appropriately encompass concerns related to
jury misconduct and tampering both during trial and during delibera-
tions. However, it may not comfort those crime victims and other vul-
nerable witnesses who know how easy it is to use a device while it
appears to be turned off, especially in a crowded courtroom. Cyber-
crime victims would know this better than most. At a local level, gang
activity was reported as a key motivation121 for a 2013 adoption of a
cell phone ban in Cook County, Illinois, which prohibited not only use,
117. Cf. United States v. Feng Ling Liu, 69 F. Supp. 3d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding
that, although juror’s use of social media during trial was improper, it did not
cause prejudicial error).
118. See McKay v. Federspiel, No. 14-CV-10252, 2014 WL 7013574 (E.D. Mich. Dec.
11, 2014) (addressing a constitutional challenge to an Electronics Ban Order im-
plemented for the purpose of preventing jurors from conducting online research,
photographing witnesses, and causing distractions).
119. Restrictions on the Possession of Cellular Telephones and Personal Electronic De-
vices, MASS. CT. SYS., http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/trial-court/exec-of
fice/ocm/banned-electronic-devices.html [http://perma.unl.edu/XN9R-TSTP].
120. N.D. SUP. CT. R. 10.1(d).
121. John Kass, Judge Did Right Thing by Banning Cellphones in Courtrooms, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-04-25/news/ct-met-
kass-0425-20130425_1_dart-evans-preckwinkles [http://perma.unl.edu/8HJS-
BLTK] (addressing the problem of “gangs using technology as muscle”).
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but possession, of cell phones in courtrooms by members of the
public.122
The ban was imposed in response to reports that persons were misusing cell
phones by photographing witnesses and jurors in courtrooms where criminal
cases are heard and in public areas of the courthouse, texting testimony to
witnesses outside the courtroom who were waiting to testify, as well as live
streaming court proceedings.123
The federal courts have remained cautious of recording devices as
well. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 53 states: “Except
as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not
permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial pro-
ceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court-
room.” This follows the recommendations of the 1996 Judicial
Conference of the United States after an extensive study by the Fed-
eral Judicial Center which expressed concern for “the intimidating ef-
fect of cameras on some witnesses and jurors.”124  Subsequent
guidelines and court-adopted rules have crafted narrow exceptions.
For example, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin provides:
Pursuant to policy established by the Judicial Conference of the United States
Courts, the following is the current policy for cameras in trial courts:
 A judge may authorize broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photo-
graphs in the courtroom and in adjacent areas during investitive, naturaliza-
tion, or other ceremonial proceedings. A judge may authorize such activities in
the courtroom or adjacent areas during other proceedings, or recesses between
such other proceedings, only:
1) for the presentation of evidence;
2) for the perpetuation of the record of the proceedings;
3) for security purposes;
4) for other purposes of judicial administration;
5) for the photographing, recording, or broadcasting of appellate arguments;
or
6) in accordance with pilot programs approved by the Judicial Conference.
 When broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing in the court-
room or adjacent areas is permitted, a judge should ensure that it is done in a
manner that will:
1) be consistent with the rights of the parties,
2) not unduly distract participants in the proceeding, and
122. Cell Phone and Electronic Communication Device Ban, CIR. CT. OF COOK COUNTY,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/HOME/CellPhoneElectronicDeviceBan.aspx
[http://perma.unl.edu/3NQT-YXMR].
123. Id. (select “Why is a ban necessary?”).
124. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 193 (2010) (“While the policy conclu-
sions of the Judicial Conference may not be binding on the lower courts, they are
‘at the very least entitled to respectful consideration.’” (quoting In re Sony BMG
Music Entm’t, 564 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009)); see, e.g., United States v. Shelnutt,
No. 4:09-CR-14, 2009 WL 3681827 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2009) (denying, subject to
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a journalist’s request to live
tweet the proceedings from the courtroom to the newspaper’s Twitter page).
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3) not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice.125
Factors such as intimidation of witnesses logically support restric-
tions on the right of public access to court proceedings and related
media rights under the First Amendment. Yet public access to high-
profile or sensitive proceedings is arguably more warranted because of
heightened public interest and the need for the public to ensure the
proceedings are just. What defines the media is beyond the scope of
this discussion, as is the line between the democratic ideals of a free
press and the role of media in entertainment. Since the earliest public
trials, members of society have had the opportunity to observe and
describe court proceedings for the purpose of entertainment and
profit.
In the nineteenth century, not only were penny dreadfuls and
Charles Dickens serializations available to tell the distressing and
shocking stories of the times, but court pamphlets summarizing and
relaying full typewritten trial transcripts of selected cases were made
publicly available for sale.126 Strangely, the academic digital reposi-
tory making these scanned archived images available to the public has
revived the tortured souls described within them. Selections for tran-
scription tended to favor murder, assault, rape, and grand larceny.127
Modern audiences are not so different in their cultural fascination
with the tragedies of the criminal justice system. Modern courts, how-
ever, remain unconcerned with this societal interest but may be dem-
onstrating more concern for the impact of disclosure and exploitation
on victims on crime, particularly in a Digital Age.
B. Closing the Courtroom128
The severe measure of closing the courtroom to the public to pro-
tect the privacy and safety interests of litigants and witnesses also
invokes significant constitutional debate. Absent a statutory man-
date,129 there is no general right to privacy which overrides the quali-
125. Electronics and Cameras in the Courtroom, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR WESTERN DIS-
TRICT WIS., http://www.wiwd.uscourts.gov/electronic-and-cameras-courtroom
[http://perma.unl.edu/L2BX-4SYY].




128. Discussion of courtroom accommodations, such as closed-circuit television for
young children, is not addressed here because it does not impact the accessibility
of court proceedings on the Internet. A member of the public or media could
record or live blog closed-circuit testimony in the same manner as live testimony,
causing the same privacy concerns.
129. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-203 (2017) (providing that adoption proceedings
shall be held in closed court).
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fied right to a public and open proceeding.130 The right to public
access to court proceedings is not unlimited,131 as demonstrated by
the court’s authority to wholly remove a person from the courtroom. A
witness, for example, may be removed from the courtroom for seques-
tration to avoid conforming testimony.132 Any person who is disrup-
tive may be ordered removed.133 A party or key witness may consent
to be absent from the courtroom as a matter of trial strategy.134
More pertinent when discussing the impact of public litigation on
crime victims, a court may remove persons from the courtroom to pro-
tect witnesses from harassment or intimidation. For example, in 2014
the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Godley applied factors
set out in Waller, discussed in Part III, in upholding the trial court’s
exclusion of members of the public in a child sexual abuse prosecution
during the testimony of the thirteen-year-old victim witness.135 The
court summarized the Waller factors in a four-part test:
(1) the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced, (2) the closure must be no broader than neces-
sary to protect this interest, (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alter-
natives to closing the proceeding, and (4) it must make findings adequate to
support the closure.136
130. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596,
607–09 (1982) (holding that a mandatory rule closing the courtroom in all sexual
abuse cases during the testimony of a minor victim witness violates the First
Amendment); France v. France, 705 S.E.2d 399, 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (con-
cerning a child-custody proceeding and asserting that no case supports “the clos-
ing of an entire proceeding merely because some evidence relating to a minor
child would be admitted”).
131. See United States v. Thompson, 713 F.3d 388, 394 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The Sixth
Amendment right to public access is, however, not absolute.”).
132. See, e.g., N.C.R. EVID. 615 (“At the request of a party the court may order wit-
nesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it
may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of
(1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party that is
not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a
person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of
his cause, or (4) a person whose presence is determined by the court to be in the
interest of justice.”).
133. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1033–34 (1977) (permitting judicial removal of
defendants and any other person from the courtroom for disrupting orderly
proceedings).
134. E.g., Wilder v. United States, 806 F.3d 653 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that defen-
dant’s absence during voir dire did not infringe on his Fifth or Sixth Amendment
rights and caused him no prejudice).
135. State v. Godley, 760 S.E.2d 285, 288–89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (addressing defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial); see supra text accompanying
note 43 (addressing the Waller factors).
136. Godley, 760 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting State v. Rollins, 729 S.E.2d 73, 77 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012)).
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When closing the courtroom, in addition to focusing on the sexual na-
ture of the offense and the adolescence of the minor victim, the trial
court in Godley made the following findings on the record:
[T]he right side of the Courtroom [is] occupied . . . with people charged with
various misdemeanors and felonies and possibly their witnesses . . . and one
reporter with the local newspaper who the Court did not recognize, and vari-
ous attorneys of those persons, seated against the right wall of the Courtroom
within the Bar.137
The North Carolina trial court also found that video feed or other tech-
nology had never been available in that county to provide a less re-
strictive alternative to closure of the courtroom.138
In 2014, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed multiple chal-
lenges to privacy measures designed to protect the parties’ privacy.139
It held that the First Amendment right of access to public records,
including judicial records, required that a record must still be made
even if a courtroom is ordered closed and the records sealed.140 It also
held that a redacted case file and docket sheet must be maintained by
the court clerks even if the legislature authorized anonymity of de-
fendants and victim witnesses.141 Finally, if the presiding judge or-
ders the courtroom closed during the trial, which was the case in this
child-sexual abuse prosecution, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that a public hearing must be provided to allow the public to contest
the order.142
Thus, while balancing similar interests to those enumerated by the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Godley, in Wyoming the emphasis
on First Amendment public right of access to the judicial system is
made far more concrete. The Associated Press lauded the Wyoming
decision, particularly for its requirement of a public opportunity to
contest a closed courtroom.143 Some aspects of this approach are con-
cerning, but these concerns are merely speculative until enough courts
in Wyoming sufficiently implement the new requirement. Victims of
crime already identified as fearful or reluctant to participate in a pub-
lic trial may find such public hearings on courtroom closures intimi-
dating. Judges may also decline to hold the hearings or encourage
137. Id. at 289 (alteration in original).
138. Id. at 290.
139. Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. v. Lee Newspapers, 332 P.3d 523 (Wyo.
2014).
140. Id. at 531.
141. Id. at 533.
142. Id. at 534 (“If the circuit court believes there is a compelling interest in further
limiting the information available to the public, it must first hold a hearing at
which members of the public have been given the opportunity to refute any alle-
gations that the case must be closed.”).
143. Wyo. Supreme Court Rules for Media in Records Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.
12, 2014), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2014/wyo.-supreme-court-rules-for-
media-in-records-case [http://perma.unl.edu/5D7M-SU67].
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counsel to avoid filing motions for closure if the hearings slow down
the judicial process. Another possibility is that in most cases, except
for already high-profile cases, no members of the public or media will
appear to contest the motion for closure and they will provide the
mere appearance of fairness without real debate.
With the current technology available to the public, however, only
a single member of the public could be present to observe court pro-
ceedings and still disseminate a personal copy of the proceedings on-
line for all to see. This practical reality suggests that a recording ban
is more important to the longstanding privacy of litigants and wit-
nesses today than closure of the courtroom.
V. PUBLIC RECORDS AND PRIVACY-RELATED EXEMPTIONS
While recording-device bans preclude creation of an alternative
public record and a means of ongoing harassment, trial transcripts
remain subject to public scrutiny as public records. Statutory public
records and open-meetings laws, termed “Sunshine Laws” for their ef-
fect of shining a light on government action, require disclosure of gov-
ernment information when requested by the public.144 Statutory
exemptions are narrowly construed but are increasing in number and
emphasis to protect persons on the basis of safety.145
The primary difference between public records laws and the mea-
sures discussed above regarding anonymity and altering access to the
trial itself is that access to public court records persists long after the
court proceedings have ended. Nevertheless, as a creature of statute,
if a carefully drawn state or federal exemption is adopted by the legis-
lature to public records or Freedom of Information Act laws, then pro-
tection from disclosure is also assured long after the trial is complete.
That approach may not prevent complete disclosure in an age when a
single release of information can spread instantly; but it would signifi-
cantly reduce the chances of ongoing disclosure and retraumatization
throughout the remainder of a cybercrime victim’s life.146 Another ad-
vantage to formulating public records exemptions on behalf of crime
victims is that the mandated narrow construction, discussed below,
reduces judicial discretion in application.147
144. See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991) (explaining that the fed-
eral FOIA was enacted to “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy”).
145. E.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Info.
Comm’n, 139 A.3d 585 (Conn. 2016) (granting deference to the safety considera-
tions of the state Freedom of Information Commission, which withheld the identi-
ties of university health-system employees who violated animal-research
protocols).
146. Burnette, supra note 29, at 1536 (noting the need to build greater trust in the
legal system among crime victims who have experienced multiple traumas).
147. E.g., The Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857 (Tenn. 2016)
(strictly construing the applicable public records exemption when denying news-
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Once government information, including judicial records, is made
public, news media and others may redisclose the information. New
technology may facilitate public access to past records beyond what we
can imagine today. As a longstanding policy, to the dismay of some,
disclosing the identity of crime victims by the public media is gener-
ally up to the discretion of the media source. For example, the Associ-
ated Press Stylebook recently added individual mental illness as a
category in which reporters should exercise caution and restraint
when reporting.148 Such efforts accompany other public policy recom-
mendations among journalists such as restrictions on revealing the
identity of rape victims or juvenile arrestees.149
The content of appellate opinions has displayed increasing judicial
willingness to describe graphically violent or intrusive information in
detail. This could again impact the well-being of crime victims once
the litigation is complete. For example, in 1932 the Supreme Court of
Oregon discussed the facts of a rape prosecution, but then exercised
considerate discretion as follows: “We omit further details of this
shameless assault until we reach the point where the girl screamed
and Donaldson put his hand over her mouth and commanded her to
keep her mouth shut.”150 In stark contrast are some of the opinions
today involving sexually violent crimes against women and children
with detailed descriptions of each act perpetrated, unlike the more
matter-of-fact, succinct descriptions of facts in murder or robbery
cases.151 Most efforts to restrict the content of public judicial records
will occur at the trial-court level.
paper defendants’ access to the criminal investigative case file in a sexual assault
prosecution when the prosecution was ongoing); see also Daniel A. Horwitz, Clos-
ing the Crime Victims Coverage Gap: Protecting Victims’ Private Records from
Public Disclosure Following The Tennessean v. Metro, 11 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 129
(2016) (analyzing the “coverage gap” left by the Tennessean court’s decision).
148. Press Release, Associated Press, Entry on Mental Illness Is Added to AP
Stylebook (Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.ap.org/press-releases/2013/entry-on-
mental-illness-is-added-to-ap-stylebook [http://perma.unl.edu/FG96-WJEJ]. Rec-
ommendations included, in part: “Do not describe an individual as mentally ill
unless it is clearly pertinent to a story and the diagnosis is properly sourced. . . .
Do not assume that mental illness is a factor in a violent crime, and verify state-
ments to that effect.” Id.
149. But see Michael Gartner, Panel Discussion Commentary, The Privacy Rights of
Rape Victims in the Media and the Law, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1135 (argu-
ing, as the President of NBC News, that naming the alleged victim in the William
Kennedy Smith rape case was the “right decision” pursuant to the duty of a free
press).
150. State v. Olsen, 7 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. 1932).
151. The author recognizes an absence of empirical research to support this subjective
assertion but stands by over twenty years of experience in legally researching the
field.
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Despite the general rule that public records are to be made availa-
ble to the public or disclosed upon request,152 numerous exemptions
have been adopted by state and federal legislatures, including those
with respect to court proceedings. Court clerks complying with public
records requests would need to carefully redact matters covered by ex-
emptions and other confidentiality laws.153
Recent amendments to the Connecticut Freedom of Information
Act demonstrate a common structure and policy for such exemptions,
including the following provisions which could encompass evidence in
court proceedings:
Nothing in the Freedom of Information Act shall be construed to require disclo-
sure of:
(1) Preliminary drafts or notes provided the public agency has determined
that the public interest in withholding such documents clearly outweighs the
public interest in disclosure;
(2) Personnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute an invasion of personal privacy;
(3) Records of law enforcement agencies not otherwise available to the public
which records were compiled in connection with the detection or investigation
of crime, if the disclosure of said records would not be in the public interest
because it would result in the disclosure of
(A) the identity of informants not otherwise known or the identity of witnesses
not otherwise known whose safety would be endangered or who would be sub-
ject to threat or intimidation if their identity was made known,
(B) the identity of minor witnesses,
(C) signed statements of witnesses,
(D) information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudi-
cial to such action,
(E) investigatory techniques not otherwise known to the general public,
(F) arrest records of a juvenile, which shall also include any investigatory
files, concerning the arrest of such juvenile, compiled for law enforcement
purposes,
(G) the name and address of the victim of a sexual assault . . . , voyeurism . . . ,
or injury or risk of injury, or impairing of morals . . . , or of an attempt thereof,
or
152. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(a) (West
2017) (“Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all
records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such
records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public
records and every person shall have the right to (1) inspect such records promptly
during regular office or business hours, (2) copy such records in accordance with
subsection (g) of section 1-212, or (3) receive a copy of such records . . . .”).
153. See, e.g., Ky. New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville, 415 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2013)
(upholding police department redaction from arrest citations and police incident
reports of information such as social security and driver’s license numbers, home
addresses, and telephone numbers of victim witnesses and defendants but not
wholesale redaction of general demographic information or total exemption of ju-
venile records); Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 871 A.2d 523 (Me. 2005)
(redacting the names of witnesses, except for the deceased priests alleged to have
been child molesters, noting that the passage of time diminishes the person’s pri-
vacy interest).
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(H) uncorroborated allegations subject to destruction . . . .154
Some crime victims receive greater protections than others, although
many exemptions to state public records laws provide broad, permis-
sive language related to crime victims generally. The Connecticut pub-
lic records statute above demonstrates a preference for victims of
violence, voyeurism, and sexual assault, as well as minor witnesses
and juvenile defendants.
In the context of records produced for and during court proceed-
ings, the U.S. Supreme Court in National Archives & Records Admin-
istration v. Favish has addressed special protections with respect to
the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).155  In Favish, the
Court upheld FOIA’s restriction on public access to death-scene photo-
graphs taken by law enforcement and admitted into evidence as an
exemption based on the personal privacy interests of the surviving
family members.156 The Court reasoned that “[f]amily members have
a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own
grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the
deceased person who was once their own.”157 In addition, law enforce-
ment records contain information about persons who may or may not
be essential to the prosecution:
There is special reason . . . to give protection to this intimate personal data, to
which the public does not have a general right of access in the ordinary course.
In this class of cases where the subject of the documents “is a private citizen,”
“the privacy interest . . . is at its apex.”158
Factors to address the broad statutory language of this FOIA provi-
sion, which protects against “unwarranted invasions of personal pri-
vacy,” include recognition of law, research, and cultural history.159
However, the Court then proceeded to recognize the abhorrent
practical implications of releasing crime scene investigative materials:
We are advised by the Government that child molesters, rapists, murderers,
and other violent criminals often make FOIA requests for autopsies, photo-
graphs, and records of their deceased victims. Our holding ensures that the
privacy interests of surviving family members would allow the Government to
deny these gruesome requests in appropriate cases. We find it inconceivable
that Congress could have intended a definition of “personal privacy” so narrow
154. § 1-210(b).
155. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (applying 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2002)).
156. Id. at 165. The applicable provision of FOIA excuses from disclosure “records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes” if their production “could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy.” § 552(b)(7)(C).
157. Favish, 541 U.S. at 168.
158. Id. at 166 (second alteration in original) (first citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Re-
porters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989); and then quot-
ing id. at 780).
159. Id. at 169.
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that it would allow convicted felons to obtain these materials without limita-
tions at the expense of surviving family members’ personal privacy.160
This is precisely the problem for crime victims in a Digital Age. Even
if a neutral reporter obtained and redisclosed the information, the
child molester, rapist, murderer, or cyberstalker could access and con-
tinually redistribute the victim’s information online. More recently,
following the Newtown elementary school massacre and the subse-
quent spate of requests for public information of the evidence, the
State of Connecticut enacted more stringent public records exemp-
tions.161 Similar to the federal law in Favish, Connecticut’s Freedom
of Information Act restricts access to photographs and video record-
ings of homicide crime scenes, as well as access to 9-1-1 tapes.162
Beyond public records exemptions, other statutory measures may,
of course, preclude public access to otherwise public judicial records.
Sealing records of criminal proceedings resulting in dismissal or a
nolle prosequi judgment, for example, were upheld by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts.163 The court crafted a more permis-
sive standard for sealing records for the purpose of assisting “criminal
defendants to reintegrate into society and obtain gainful employment,
particularly in an age of rapid informational access through the in-
ternet and other new technologies.”164 No other court decision has so
succinctly addressed the risks of the Internet to crime victims or ac-
knowledged their substantial privacy concerns following litigation.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts acknowledged the com-
promise of sealing records following a public trial when the public and
the media had full access during the proceedings.165 This approach
relies on a short public attention span.  If the court tacitly permitted
the public to record testimony and images of evidence at trial, such
recordings could emerge online in the future regardless of the sealing
of records.
Court personnel ordinarily would be tasked with understanding
how to secure confidential information and protect against inadver-
160. Id. at 170.
161. See Dispute Over Newtown 911 Tapes Tests New Conn. Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2013/dispute-over-newtown-
911-tapes-tests-new-conn-law [http://perma.unl.edu/7CFX-UP69].
162. Freedom of Information Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b)(27) (West 2017)
(noting that the FOIA does not require disclosure of photographs and videos “to
the extent that such record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of the personal privacy of the victim or the victim’s surviving
family members”).
163. Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182 (Mass. 2014).
164. Id. at 186; see also id. at 196 (“[T]he sealing of a small subset of criminal records
after the cases have closed does not truly impede the functioning of [public access
to court proceedings].”).
165. Id. at 182.
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tent disclosure.166 Recognition of public records laws and their excep-
tions is essential but more challenging in a Digital Age.167 Despite
exemptions and exceptions limiting public records access, data
breaches of court records risk disclosure of vast amounts of personal
information, and the incidents of massive data breaches across the
world are on the rise.168 For example, in 2016, a Superior Court tran-
sitioning between software systems for its courthouse computers inad-
vertently made vast amounts of protected information public,
including the birth date, social security number, home address, and
driver’s license number of all defendants in the system.169 The oppo-
site result is possible as well, where a court may find that a categorical
withholding of records may constitute an excessive interpretation of a
public records exemption.170 Despite their practical challenges in im-
plementation, public records exceptions provide the courts with more
166. NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT PERS. POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL, RULE 51
(NEB. SUPREME COURT 2017) https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/personnel-and-
miscellaneous-rules/nebraska-supreme-court-personnel-policies-and-procedures-
manual/51 [http://perma.unl.edu/J4FT-8SAM] (“The employees of the Nebraska
Court System must be concerned with the area of confidentiality because of the
nature of some of the information handled by the judicial system. Some of the
information in the courts is public information and it is the duty of many employ-
ees to help provide this kind of information to those requesting it. Employees are
also exposed to some information that must be held in the strictest of confidence
and must never be released unless it is absolutely certain that it is appropriate.
There are several sections of the state and federal law which refer to various
types of confidentiality and penalties involved for not adhering to those policies.
With the supervisor’s guidance, all confidential information should be kept in a
secure place not readily accessible by other persons.”).
167. For example, Standard 8-4.1(b) of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, Conduct of
Judges and Court Personnel in Criminal Cases, states:
Court personnel, including judges and law clerks, should not disclose,
cause to be disclosed, or condone or authorize the disclosure of informa-
tion, images, or documents relating to a criminal matter that are not
part of the public court record. This Standard should not be construed as
prohibiting court personnel from releasing or authorizing the release of a
record or document that the court is required to release under state open
records laws or the federal Freedom of Information Act, upon receipt of a
proper request.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARD 8-4.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); see also
Jennifer A. Brobst, Reverse Sunshine in the Digital Wild Frontier: Protecting In-
dividual Privacy Against Public Records Requests for Government Databases, 42
N. KY. L. REV. 197 (2015) (analyzing the “Reverse Sunshine” effect in which the
lives of individuals are made more transparent than government actions through
public records requests).
168. See generally Colin J.A. Oldberg, Note, Organizational Doxing: Disaster on the
Doorstep, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 181 (2016).
169. Monica Vaughn, Courthouse Data Breach Exposes Personal Information, APPEAL
DEMOCRACT.COM (June 13, 2016), http://www.appeal-democrat.com/news/court
house-data-breach-exposes-personal-information/article_80a08626-31fa-11e6-b2
27-c75f0f72438a.html [http://perma.unl.edu/CY47-4CDZ].
170. E.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 746
F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that the Department of Justice could not with-
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guidance from the legislature on the weight to be provided to the pri-
vacy of crime victims than that provided by the grant of judicial dis-
cretion to award Jane Doe status or to clear a courtroom.
VI. NOT SO PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
If the protective measures described above are not successful, a
cybercrime victim may have some limited private rights of action. As
discussed in section III.B., because cyberstalking and cyberbullying
involve online speech and expression, even if, or especially because,
they are anonymous, the victim-plaintiff may have insurmountable le-
gal challenges in bringing a claim. Several possible civil actions are
briefly addressed below.171
A. Statutory Remedies
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amend-
ment protects redisclosure of the identities of crime victims present in
public records, absent narrowly tailored statutory restrictions.172 In
Florida Star v. B.J.F., Justice Marshall wrote for the majority, hold-
ing that a Florida statute prohibiting newspapers from publishing the
names of rape victims in criminal trials violated the First Amendment
right to free speech and freedom of the press.173 Although the trial
court and appellate court used the victim’s initials rather than her
name, the investigative report by the Sheriff had identified her full
name.174 The majority determined that the statute was underinclu-
sive with respect to the state’s purported interest in protecting the
victim’s privacy.175 The statute only restricted the mass media from
disseminating the victim’s identity. Thus, the Court noted that:
An individual who maliciously spreads word of the identity of a rape victim is
thus not covered, despite the fact that the communication of such information
hold all law enforcement-related records in the public corruption prosecution of
Jack Abramoff and others).
171. Although the vast majority of civil cases are settled and most criminal cases are
pled out, the safe exchange of discovery is often reliant on the discretion of the
attorneys.
172. See generally Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding the
press cannot be sanctioned for redisclosure of information in already-disclosed
public court documents); Cheyenne Newspapers Inc. v. First Judicial Dist. Court,
358 P.3d 493 (Wyo. 2015).
173. 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (analyzing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03).
174. Id. at 527; see also id. at 526 n.1 (“No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or
cause or allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass
communication the name, address, or other identifying fact or information of the
victim of any sexual offense within this chapter. An offense under this section
shall constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in
§ 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.” (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West
1987))).
175. Id. at 540.
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to persons who live near, or work with, the victim may have consequences as
devastating as the exposure of her name to large numbers of strangers.176
If this language was meant to encourage state legislatures to craft
broader but more effective statutory remedies for redisclosure of crime
victim evidence, it has not yet borne fruit.
B. Defamation
Plaintiffs who attempt to sue those who post defamatory remarks
online are faced with additional barriers if the poster made comments
anonymously. Because the freedom of anonymous speech is well estab-
lished,177 efforts to unveil the poster during discovery in order to
prove the elements of libel have proven difficult.178 For example, in
California, proof of false facts in the posting must appear on its face
before disclosure of the defendant’s identity is permitted, while opin-
ion also remains a defense: “However pernicious an opinion may seem,
we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas.”179
A victim of cyberstalking and revenge porn will not be able to avail
herself of a defamation cause of action when harassed with the truth
or with what may be deemed a legitimate opinion about her charac-
ter.180 Nor should she have to rely solely on rehabilitating her reputa-
tion online if she is a stalking victim.  In short, the Court relegates her
nonlegal options to suffering in silence, entering the marketplace of
public comment to defend herself—risking greater loss of privacy—or
self-help.181
C. Invasion of Privacy
Invasion-of-privacy claims are notoriously difficult to pursue.182
For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a newspa-
176. Id.
177. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (defining Internet speech as
protected under the First Amendment and anonymous Internet speech as akin to
a pamphleteer or eighteenth-century town crier).
178. E.g., Doe 2 v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (denying
an anti-SLAPP motion against the plaintiff who had received an anonymous
whistle-blower email via a gmail account).
179. Id. at 69 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974)).
180. See also Shimizu, supra note 2, at 131–34 (addressing anonymous speech and
other First Amendment protected speech made by offenders in cybercrime cases).
181. Cf. Dana Littlefield, Rape Victim Did Her Own Detective Work to Find Her Assail-
ants, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-rape-
victim-20170129-story.html [http://perma.unl.edu/AW3U-B7DZ] (describing a
young-adult survivor who was determined to find her unknown offenders and
conducted her own Internet investigation which lead to successful felony sex of-
fense prosecutions).
182. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that false-light invasion-of-privacy claims,
which arise when publicity places a person in a false light before the public, are
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per could not be held liable for publishing a truthful article on a pris-
oner-rape case.183 In South Carolina, an invasion-of-privacy claim
fails when it is a matter of “legitimate public or general interest.”184
Here, the rape victim unwillingly had become an actor in a matter of
public interest and therefore could not claim the article was an inva-
sion of privacy.185 Lawsuits against Internet providers or website
owners for unlawful postings on their sites continue to meet resistance
under the federal Communications Decency Act.186
D. Employee Harassment
In cyberstalking and cyberbullying cases emerging from the work-
place, if an employer policy prevents a victim employee from engaging
in defensive email exchanges or other forms of communication to fore-
stall the abuse, the employee may have little recourse other than
traditional discrimination actions. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the First Amendment does not protect statements made as part
of one’s job.187 “Whistle-blower protection statutes or labor law might
provide a remedy (particularly if an employee is punished for report-
ing illegal acts), but the Constitution does not.”188 Tort remedies for
employment-based sexual harassment may also be an option, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress.189
Scholar Aily Shimizu makes an astute observation when proposing
reforms to cyberstalking legislation, which is that legal analysis of In-
ternet crime has attempted to “seek[ ] a familiar analogy for the unfa-
miliar.”190 This problematic and inadequate approach is
demonstrated by the concerns expressed herein regarding access to
public court records in digital formats, as well as the paucity of private
no longer recognized, as they were duplicative of defamation claims. Denver
Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 (Colo. 2002).
183. Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 496 S.E.2d 636 (S.C. 1998).
184. Id. at 636.
185. Id. at 637.
186. See, e.g., Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2016) (regarding an acquittee
who filed tort claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and false light against a website operator who hosted an article discussing the
acquittee’s rape trial and the allegations against him); see also Katherine Rush-
ton, Facebook in the Dock: Web Giant Refuses to Take Down Child Abuse
Images—Then Reports BBC Journalist to Police for Sending Them the Pictures,
DAILY MAIL (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4288880/
Facebook-tackled-failure-remove-sexualised-pictures-children.html (reporting on
Facebook’s refusal to remove sexualized images of children).
187. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (holding that the Constitution does
not restrict an employer’s ability to manage the workplace, including matters af-
fecting speech).
188. Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2009).
189. See generally L. Camille He´bert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1345 (2014).
190. Shimizu, supra note 2, at 137.
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rights of action should the criminal litigation result in greater harmful
exposure for the cybercrime victim. The world has not evolved; it has
changed, demanding new remedies to new problems.
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to sufficiently protect cybercrime victims from additional
devastating losses of privacy during and after litigation, courts must
acknowledge the risk of harm as real, albeit new to both individuals
and society. Legislatures have begun to take positive steps by amend-
ing public records laws to specifically include exemptions for crime
victim privacy interests.191 Courts, in turn, can more effectively im-
plement these laws and related policies by requiring recognition of the
harms of disclosure in a Digital Age in the form of a clear factor for
consideration when addressing litigant or witness anonymity or when
restricting public recording of court proceedings.
Granted, the legal privacy protections available for cybercrime vic-
tims are only as effective as the witness’s own willingness to make use
of them. As stated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the
protection of jury anonymity: “If jurors voluntarily waive their ano-
nymity and consent to interviews on matters other than jury delibera-
tions, so be it. They need not become unwilling pawns in the frenzied
media battle over these cases.”192 Not all cybercrime victims may
want or seek privacy protections such as Jane Doe status, sealed
records, or redaction of evidentiary transcriptions. However, for those
who do, such remedies, appropriately adapted to a Digital Age, should
be promoted and available in state and federal courts.
Any “frenzied media battle” demonstrates both a heightened public
interest in litigation as well as a potentially heightened interest by
litigants to obtain protection from the fray. The U.S. Supreme Court
continues to rigorously uphold constitutional protections of the right
to a fair and public trial, including access to public court records.
Nearly thirty years ago, the Court expressed a content-based prefer-
ence for ensuring public access to violent-crime litigation and cases
involving salacious or particularly disturbing matters. The Court as-
serted that “[c]riminal acts, especially certain violent crimes, provoke
public concern, outrage, and hostility. When the public is aware that
the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is function-
ing, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emo-
191. See Comm’r of Pub. Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 93 A.3d 1142, 1166
(Conn. 2014) (“Given the continuing vigorous legislative debate on open govern-
ment matters both in 1994 and today, we deem balancing the various interests
and articulating a coherent policy on this matter to be a uniquely legislative
function.”).
192. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 921 (5th Cir. 2001).
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tions.”193 No mention is made of the hardship to crime victims, but the
Court has on occasion expressed sympathy for the onus placed on vic-
tim witnesses in litigation.194 State courts are more explicitly recog-
nizing the negative impact on the privacy of litigants and witnesses
today.195
In an age with new cybercrimes and new risks to privacy, a re-
balancing of interests is needed. That is, the courts should protect the
right to public access to the degree that they maintain the right to a
fair trial but not to the degree that such access brings to life the mod-
ern, but still lurid, penny dreadful without sufficient justification.196
Crime victims would be more likely to report crime and cooperate with
the criminal justice system to punish their offenders if they had
greater privacy protections. If the legal system does not adequately
protect them but instead only enhances the gravamen of the harm of
the original offense by exposing their victimization online, then the
administration of justice cannot be fully achieved. Despite the power
of subpoena and contempt orders, victims of crime can and do refuse to
cooperate when they feel it is in their best interests.197 The legislature
and judiciary may best intervene to protect the growing privacy inter-
ests of litigants and witnesses in public prosecutions in a Digital Age
by adapting mechanisms to manage the courtroom experience and its
permanent record.  In doing so, they will also enhance the administra-
tion of justice through expanded cooperation in seeking justice.
193. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (quoting Press-
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984)).
194. Cf. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (sympathizing with a rape vic-
tim’s need for privacy in litigation, despite holding a state statute designed to
provide such protection in violation of the First Amendment).
195. See, e.g., State v. Godley, 760 S.E.2d 285, 288–89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014); supra text
accompanying note 135.
196. See Harbert Davenport, Roy Bean: Law West of the Pecos, 22 TEX. L. REV. 118,
118 (1943) (book review) (“It is the true tale of a typical Western ‘bad man’ as he
was, and not as the ‘penny dreadfuls’ believed him to be.”).
197. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2015 (2016), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15_sum.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/G5LN-AUWP]
(“In 2015, less than half (47%) of violent victimizations and more than half (55%)
of serious violent victimizations were reported to police. A greater percentage of
robberies and aggravated assaults (62% each) were reported than simple assaults
(42%) and rape or sexual assaults (32%).”).
